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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY WEST CHANDLER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CALVIN D. WEST, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16123 
This is an appeal from an Order requiring defendant to 
make monthly payments, to be applied to mortgage payments on 
the home, pursuant to the terms of a Decree of Divorce. The 
Order arose from a hearing on plaintiff's order to show cause 
relating to said monthly payments. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, Honorable Maurice Harding, ordered the defendant to 
continue making monthly payments to plaintiff pursuant to the 
terms of paragraph 2 (R. 75) of Decree of Divorce "until such 
time as plaintiff has received from defendant principal 
payments equal to the outstanding principal balance on said 
mortgage on the date hereof." (R. 115) The defendant was also 
ordered to pay unpaid installments amounting to $569.04. The 
court held that the monthly payments were part of a property 
settlement (R. 147) and were, therefore, not affected by the 
subsequent remarriage of plaintiff or her sale of the home 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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awarded to her. The court did make an equitable adjustment in 
the amount of the monthly payment, noting that the amount 
stated in paragraph 2 ($176.50) included taxes and fire 
insurance which defendant was not obligated to pay. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 28, 1976 plaintiff filed 3 Complaint for 
-
Divorce. (R. 2-4) On April 9, 1976 defendant answered, askinc 
that the Complaint be dismissed and denying certain allegatiom 
made in the Complaint. Pursuant to plaintiff's Order to Sh~ 
Cause, a hearing was heard on May 19, 1976, which resulted in 
issuance of an Order granting plaintiff the use of the home anc 
requiring defendant to pay all bills, including the mortgage 
payment, during the pendency of the action. (R. 52-53) 
On January 5, 1977 the parties entered into an 
agreement entitled Stipulation, Waiver and Property Settlement 
for Divorce. (R. 64-67) Pursuant to the terms of the 
Stipulation, defendant was to be awarded certain real proper~ 
in Florida purchased in January, 1972 for $3,500. (R. 33) 
Defendant indicated that the present value of the property we 
unknown (R. 33), while plaintiff estimated the value at 
approximately $7,500. Defendant was also to be awarded the 
parties 1973 Volkswagon van, purchased for approximately $6,4M 
(R. 17), and certain items of furniture pursuant to the 
agreement between the parties. (R. f 5) 
Defendant was also to be awarded another major item of 
property (R. 69), which was his interest in a retirement plan 
sponsored by Prudential Insurance Company through his place of 
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employment at the Department of Employment Security of the 
State of Utah. (R. 66) Attached to the Stipulation was a 
document entitled Summary of Retirement Plan Features (R. 
90-99), which provided a summary of the benefits available 
pursuant to the plan.l/ 
The Stipulation provided that plaintiff should be 
awarded the home in Utah, estimated by plaintiff to be worth 
$46,000 with a mortgage indebtedness of $13,653.46. (R. 16) 
The agreement stated, in paragraph 2, that defendant "shall 
make all mortgage payments on said property and shall pay off 
and satisfy any and all liens presently in existence on the 
property." (R.64) Plaintiff was also to receive the 1975 
Mustang car, certain household furniture, fixtures and 
appliances already in her possession and alimony in the amount 
of $300 per month. (R. 65) 
l/ Plaintiff calculates the present value of 
defendant's retirement plan interest as of the date of the 
original Decree of Divorce at approximately $174,583.94. The 
amount was computed as follows: (1) the defendant contributed 
$2,060. 24 to the retirement plan in 1976 (R. 32), and $2,121.84 
in 1977. (R. 90) Since retirement contributions are 7% of 
base pay (R. 90), defencJnt's base pay was $29,432 in 1976 and 
$30,312 in 1977. (2) According to Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Summary of Retirement Plan Features, defendant's 
non-forfeitable retirement plan benefit at the time of the 
Decree was approximately $16,336 per year, which is computed by 
multiplying base earnings ($29,000) by 2% times all years of 
credited service. The resultant figure was then reduced by 6% 
pursuant to the requirement of Section 5(c) of the Summary 
because defendant was 52 years old at the time of issuance of 
the Decree. (R. 31) ( 3) The defendant, had he retired in 
1977, would have had the right to receive approximately $16,356 
per year for his life expectancy. Assuming a 25-year life 
expectancy, the total benefit would be $408,900. The present 
value of the right to receive said benefits, assuming an 8% 
interest rate, is $174,583.94. 
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On January 25, 1977, the matter came before the court 
for hearing, with plaintiff appearing in person and with 
counsel and defendant waiving appearance. Based on said 
hearing, a Decree of Divorce was executed on February 9, 1977, 
incorporating the basic items of the Stipulation, Waiver and 
Property Settlement. (R. 74-75) 
Beginning in August, 1977, defendant stopped paying 
the monthly property settlement payments; and plaintiff filed 
an Order to Show Cause on November 14, 1977, requesting that 
defendant be directed to pay the unpaid mortgage payments and 
to pay all future mortgage payments as they accrued. (R. 104) 
Defendant filed an Affidavit on December 20, 1977 alleging tha: 
he intended the monthly obligations to be in the nature of 
support which should terminate on plaintiff's remarriage. (R, 
107-108) Defendant also argues in his brief that he filed a 
Motion to Set Aside and/or Modify Decree, al though this clear!• 
did not take place prior to the hearing on plain ti ff' s petitio: 
because the filing date is February 9, 1979. (R. 164-166) 
A detailed hearing was held on these matters on 
January 26, 1978. The court ruled that the mortgage payments 
were part of a property settlement and not in the nature of 
support, noting in making the determination, that the alimony 
was separately stated in the Decree. (R. 22) The court's 
Order (R. 115-116), directs the defendant to pay the unpaid 
installments of the mortgage payments and to continue to make 
such payments until principal payments equal to the outstandinc 
principal balance on the home have been paid to plaintiff. 
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However, the rourt did exercise its equitable powers to modify 
the property settlement to a $122.06 monthly amount because the 
original $176.50 monthly amount included taxes and fire 
insurance which the court determined were not intended in the 
original Decree. 
Defendant has now appealed to this court. (R.117) 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court properly issued its Order filed 
September 28, 1978 (R. 115-116), for the following three 
reasons: 
1. The monthly mortgage payments required of 
defendant constituted part of the property settlement 
between the parties; 
2. Plaintiff has not proven a change in 
circumstances of the magnitude necessary to warrant any 
additional modification of the property settlement; and 
3. Although the original Decree of Divorce was 
based on a Stipulation of the parties, the Decree was the 
product of the trial court in exercising its equity 
jurisdiction and the subsequent Order issued on review of 
the Decree does not fail due to a mistake and 
misunderstanding of the parties. 
In its brief, plaintiff urges this court to reverse or 
modify the Order on these grounds: 
(1) That the monthly payments, to be applied 
toward the mortgage, were in the nature of support and 
terminated upon plaintiff's remarriage and sale of the 
property; 
-5-
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(2) That if the court finds the month:.. payments 
to be part of a property settlement, it should exercise it: 
equitable jurisdiction to modify the agreement due to a 
material change of circumstances; and 
(3) That, in the alternative, the court find 
that the provisions of the Decree are founded upon a 
stipulation containing a material mistake requiring a 
remand for litigation regarding the mortgage payment issue. 
In this brief, plaintiff, Shirley West Chandler, 
demonstrates that defendant's arguments are unsupported by 
authority and that the trial court's Order was correct and 
should be affirmed. 
POINT I 
THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS MADE BY PLAINTIFF, TO BE APPLIED 
TO THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS, WERE PART OF A PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT. 
Defendant's principal challenge to the Order of the 
trial court relates to paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce: 
2. That the Plaintiff be and she hereby is 
awarded the parties' home located at 2646 Dolphin Way, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, free 
and clear of any claim or interest of the Defendant. 
Defendant be and he hereby is ordered to make all mortga~ 
payments on said property and to pay off and satisfy any 
and all liens on the property, if any exist. The Defendant 
be and he hereby is additionally ordered to pay the 
Plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seventy Six Dollars and 
Fifty Cents ($176.50) each month, commencing immediately, 
to be applied to the mortgage payments on said home. 
(R. 75) 
The basis of the Order dated September 28, 1978 is th< 
trial court's determination, made after a detailed hearing witn 
the parties and counsel, that the above paragraph requires 
- 6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defend3nt to make payments of principal to plaintiff in an 
amount equal to the outstanding mortgage on the home, whether 
or not the home is sold. This Court has consistently held that 
the trial court in a divorce action has considerable latitude 
of discretion in adjusting financial and property interests and 
that his findings and judgment should not be upset unless the 
evidence clearly proponderates against them or unless the 
decree or order works such an injustice that equity and 
conscience demand that it be revised. , (Christensen v. 
Christensen, 21 Utah 2nd 263, 444 P.2d 54 (1968); English v. 
English, 565 P. 2d 409 (Utah, 1977); Hanson v. Hanson, 537 P. 2d 
491 (Utah, 1975)) Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 
P.2d 503 (1966). In short, the party appealing from such an 
order has the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the findings; or such a serious inequity has resulted 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Defendant has 
proven none of the above. 
It is not necessary, however, to rely on the fact that 
the trial court did not make any of the serious errors set 
forth by this Court as grounds for setting aside a trial 
court's order or decree in a divorce matter. Evidence in the 
record supports the trial court's determination that the 
paragraph 2 language constitutes a property settlement 
obligation of the defendant. Defendant was ordered to "pay all 
mortgage payments on said property and to pay off and satisfy 
-7-
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any and all liens on such property, if any exist." (Emphasis 
added) Can the trial court be accused of misinterpreting 
paragraph 2 when it concluded that "all" meant the entire 
outstanding mortgage amount? 
Defendant in his brief gives emphasis to the phrase 
"if any exist" at the end of the second sentence of paragraph 
2. (Brief for Appellant at 5) Reference to paragraph 6 of the 
Findings of Fact (R. 69) and to paragraph 2 of the Stipulation 
indicates that defendant is drawing undue inferences from such 
phrase, which was not included in either of the above-named 
paragraphs. The interpretation of the sentence is simple and 
clear: the defendant is to pay all mortgage payments and he is 
to pay any existing liens. 
Defendant's principal contention is that plaintiff's 
remarriage and the sale of the home somehow relieve defendent 
of his obligation. Remarriage is not a basis for relief froma 
property settlement obligation. In addition, the record 
provides no indication that the payments should terminate with 
the sale of the home. In fact, paragraph 2 requires the 
defendant to make "all" mortgage payments. The mortgage must 
be "paid" whether or not the home is sold. 
But, argues defendant, treating the monthly payments 
as support results in a more rational result. (Brief for 
Appellant at 6) Assuming for the sake of argument that an 
ambiguity existed in the original Decree, defendant's own 
argument, based on Smith v. Smith, 351 P.2d 142 (Wash., 1960), 
that this Court should interpret the provision so as to lead ~ 
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a rational result proves fatal to his case. When the value of 
defendant's retirement plan interest is added into the property 
distribution totals, defendant, even after paying off the 
mortgage, receives a net property settlement of approximately 
$169,500, whereas the plaintiff will receive approximately 
$60,000. The defendant surely cannot expect this Court of 
equity to adopt its tortured interpretation of paragraph 2 
then, in addition, terminate defendant's payment obligation 
which would result in a property settlement disparity of 
$136,500 ($182,500 for defendant and $46,000 for plaintiff). 
The rational interpretation is that the trial court awarded to 
plaintiff the entire value of the home; the monthly payment 
were provided to avoid burdening defendant with a large 
lump-sum payment requirement. 
After making the rationality argument, supra, which 
plaintiff has demonstrated to be fallacious, defendant observed 
that he may have another hurdle to cross even if this Court 
finds the monthly payments to be in the nature of support. 
That is, as summarized in defendant's brief, the general rule 
in the majority of jurisdictions, in cases where the parties 
make one agreement which settles support and property rights, 
is that where the agreement's provisions for support are an 
integral and inseparable part of the property settlement, as 
where the payments are in consideration for a transfer of 
property, a decree based on that agreement cannot be modified 
with respect to support. (Brief for Appellant at 7; see, also, 
61 ALR § 19(a) p.590 which cites Callist~r v. Callister, l Utah 
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2nd 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953) as holding or recognizing the 
rule) In his brief defendant has cited a number of cases from 
foreign jurisdictions which set forth the test for determining 
whether support provisions are "separable" or "inseparable." 
(Brief for Appellant at 8-10) Defendant concludes that: 
The critical element in determining whether such 
payments were part of an integrated property settlement, 
and therefore non-modifiable in the majority of 
jurisdictions, is whether the agreement to make such 
payments was made in return for a relinquishment of 
property rights of similar value by the other party. 
(Brief for Appellant at 10) 
Applying the rule to the present case, defendant 
concludes that: 
the greatly disportionate share of the property received by 
plaintiff is a strong indication the monthly payments of 
$176.50 were in the nature of support, ... , and were not 
part of an integrated property settlement. 
(Brief for Appellant at 10) 
Unfortunately for defendant, when the true values of 
the properties are evaluated, after inclusion of the value of 
defendant's $175,000 retirement property right, the conclusion 
is reversed. That is, defendant's own test indicates that the 
monthly payments, if support, were part of an integrated 
property settlement and hence non-modifiable. 
In brief summary, defendant, in effect, is asking this 
Court to make four determinations in order to reach the 
conclusion that the monthly payments should be terminated. The 
Court must determine: 
(1) that the paragraph 2 monthly payment 
language requiring defendant to make all payments on the 
mortgage is ambiguous; 
-10-
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(2) that the trial court in interpreting 
paragraph 2 was guilty of an abuse of discretion; 
(3) that the rational interpretation of the 
paragraph is to treat the monthly payments as support 
payments, which terminate with plaintiff's marriage, 
leaving plaintiff with $46,000 in property and defendant 
with $182,500 in property; and 
(4) that the "support" payments were not part of 
an integrated property settlement despite the fact that the 
actual property distribution clearly indicates an 
integrated settlement under the test set forth by defendant. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ALLEGED OR PROVEN SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE 
IN CIRCUMSTANCES NECESSARY FOR MODIFICATION OF 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT. 
Defendant argues in his brief that pursuant to power 
granted in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1975), this Court (and the 
trial court) has the power to modify a property settlement 
under a decree of divorce upon a proper showing of change of 
circumstances. In support of his argument defendant cites two 
Utah cases. 
Plaintiff agrees with defendant's conclusion, stated 
in his brief, that the general rule in the majority of 
jurisdictions is that the property settlement portion of 
decrees are unmodifiable. (Brief for Appellant at 7) 
Plaintiff also agrees that a Utah court has the authority, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1975), to modify certain 
property settlement provisions. The cases cited by defendant 
-11-
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indicate that a Utah court can modify the property settlement 
portion of a decree, when circumstances justify, if a property 
settlement agreement between the parties was not the basis of 
the property distribution portion of the decree. 
It is far from clear that Utah courts have authority 
to modify the property settlement portion of a decree which is 
based on a property settlement agreement of the parties. 
Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944 (Utah, 1953) is the 
principal Utah authority on the issue. In Callister, cited by 
defendant in his brief, the defendant was challenging a trial 
court ordered reduction in alimony payments from $400 per month 
to $250 per month due to changed circumstances. This Court, 
referring to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953), which is 
substantially similar to the current statute, held that the 
alimony was modifiable. However, this Court took great pains 
to clarify that the payments were not in settlement of property 
rights and quoted with approval the following language from a 
California case: 
This does not mean that payments under property 
settlement agreements may be modified even though 
incorporated in the decree. They may not. (citing 
cases). But in such situation there is not the same 
underlying policy. The settlement of property rights 
should be final in order to secure stability of titles. 
Callister, supra, 261 P.2d at 948. 
A consideration of the two cases cited by defendant in 
his brief provide no assistance in clarifying the Utah rule 
when a property settlement agreement between the parties is 
involved. Neither case involved a property settlement 
-12-
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agreement. In fact, each case supports plaintiff's contention 
that the Utah courts rarely modify property settlement 
provisions of decrees even when property settlement agreements 
are not involved. The case of Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 
1126 (Utah, 1979), contains dicta to the effect that the court 
has the power to take property from one spouse and award it to 
another where the interests of justice so require. However, no 
cases were cited to support this claim and in fact, the Iverson 
case, itself, did not result in a modification of the original 
property settlement. In Dixon v. Dixon, 240 P.2d 1211 (Utah, 
1952), this Court again considered it property redistribution 
powers. The original decree in Dixon awarded rental property 
to the plaintiff, but further provided that in the event the 
plaintiff failed to make the remaining payments on the 
mortgage, the defendant had the right to make said payments and 
acquire the property. When the defendant later made said 
payments due to an illness-related inability of the plaintiff 
to pay, this Court was requested to determine whether the terms 
of the original decree would be enforced to require plaintiff 
to deed the rental property to defendant. This Court referred 
to its power to modify property distribution provisions of 
decrees under the Utah Code Ann. § 40-3-5 (1943), but when 
specific reference was made to the property issue, the Court 
concluded that the property provisions of the original decree 
were not intended to take effect if the inability of plaintiff 
to pay off the indebtedness was due to her mental or physical 
health. In other words, no modification powers were actually 
exercised. 
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If this Court finds that the Utah rule will allow 
modification of property distribution provisions based on 
property settlement agreements, then it must agree that such 
modifications are to be made only when a substantial change of 
circumstance has occurred. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 
1090 (1978); English v. English, 565 P. 2d 409 (1977). The 
defendant has clearly not met his burden of proving such 
substantial change in circumstance. In fact, Point II of 
defendant's brief indicates simply that plaintiff has sold her 
interest in the home for $60,000 and defendant has been 
relieved of his $300 per month alimony obligation. (Brief for 
Appellant at 11) According to the facts set forth in 
defendant's own brief, the home was valued at approximately 
$46,000 at the time of the decree in January of 1976. So the 
net change of circumstances is an increase in home equity of 
$14,000 to plaintiff and a decrease of $300 per month in 
defendant's obligation. No mention is made of relevant changes 
in defendant's financial condition. For the information of the 
Court, the sale of the home in July, 1977 was by contract, 
meaning that plaintiff was not relieved of her obligation under 
the mortgage. However, in November of 1978 plaintiff was paid 
off on the contract, at which time she paid the remaining 
balance on the mortgage. 
Defendant in his brief failed to include in the change 
of circumstance summary any facts regarding defendant's pension 
benefits. Plaintiff contends that such rights were worth 
approximately $175, 000 at the time of the Decree of Divorce and 
-14-
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have undoubtedly increased in value as defendant nears age 55. 
If th~ $175,000 figure is added to defendant's alleged $5,500 
deficit after paying the mortgage payments (Brief for Appellant 
at 12), defendant still is receiving net property of $169,500, 
while plaintiff is receiving property of $60,000; hardly an 
inequitable distribution for defendant. This Court, 
recognizing the inequity of defendant's argument, should 
confirm the Order of the trial court. 
POINT III 
A STIPULATION IN MATTERS OF DIVORCE, CUSTODY AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS rs ONLY ADVISORY TO THE COURT WHICH 
MUST WEIGH ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TO FASHION A 
JUST AND EQUITABLE DECREE. 
Defendant contends that the Decree of the trial court 
was founded upon a stipulation containing a material mistake 
and misunderstanding regarding mortgage payments. Defendant 
further argues that based on the traditional mistake theory in 
contracts, the mortgage payment portion of the Decree should be 
rescinded and the case remanded for reconsideration by the 
trial court. 
Although plaintiff contends that no such mutual 
mistake occurred in the Stipulation, it is plaintiff's further 
contention that the Stipulation was only advisory to the trial 
court, which had the clear duty to weigh all facts and 
circumstances in fashioning an equitable Decree. This Court 
has consistently held that the trial court in a divorce 
proceeding is not bound by the terms of an agreement or 
stipulation of the parties. Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 
-15-
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(Utah, 1977); Pearson v. Pearson, 561P.2d 1030 (Utah, 1977); 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah, 1975); Christensen v. 
Christensen, 18 Utah 2d 315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967); Mathie v. 
Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779 (1961). In Klein, supra, 
the plaintiff challenged entry of a supplemental decree 
adjusting the finance and property interests of the parties. 
The supplemental decree was necessary to make final 
determina~ions left open by the original decree and was based 
on a stipulation of the parties. Plaintiff contended on appeal 
that he should not be bound by the stipulation because he 
either did not understand and/or was subject to duress in 
agreeing to the Stipulation, or his agreement was timely and 
properly withdrawn. This Court responded: 
It is the established rule that a stipulation 
pertaining to matters of divorce, custody and property 
rights therein, though advisory upon the court and would 
usually be followed unless the court thought it unfair or 
unreasonable, is not necessarily binding on the court 
anyway. It is only a recommendation to be adhered to if 
the court believes it to be fair and reasonable. In 
addition to all of the foregoing, there is no reason that 
the trial court cannot consider what was proposed by the 
parties as a stipulation, and what was said by them or 
their counsel about it, as part of the total facts and 
circumstances upon which to fashion what in his judgment is 
a just and equitable decree. 
Klein, supra, at 544 P.2d 476. 
Later, in Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977), 
this Court again emphasized the latitude and discretion granted 
to a trial court in disposition of property. By the terms of 
the decree of divorce in Naylor, the parties were each awarded 
an undivided one-hclf interest in all of the real property. 
Later, by agreement, the parties adjusted the ownership on 
-16~ 
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certain of the properties between themselves. A subsequent 
sale of the properties resulted in one party receiving the bulk 
of the sale proceeds. This Court upheld an order of the trial 
court awarding the proceeds of the sale of the real property on 
the basis of one-half each pursuant to the prior terms of the 
decree of divorce, noting that: 
It is the court's prerogative to make whatever 
disposition of property as it deems fair, equitable and 
necessary for the protection and welfare of the parties, 
and the court need not necessarily abide by the terms of an 
agreement of the parties. 
Naylor, supra, at 563 P.2d 185. 
The distinction between the normal rule of contracts 
and the rule which governs contracts presented to a divorce 
court, which defendant fails to understand, is admirably stated 
in a case from a neighboring jurisdiction. In Anthony v. 
Anthony, 94 C.A.2d 507, 211 P.2d 331 (1949), the court was 
requested to modify a property settlement agreement which was 
never made part of a divorce decree. The court, in reaching 
its holding that the settlement agreement must be construed 
according to the ordinary rules of contracts, stated: 
It is fundamental that the jurisdiction of a 
court to modify a property settlement, even assuming that 
it could decide that what purported to be a property 
settlement agreement was meant and intended to be alimony, 
would be derived from its original jurisdiction in the 
divorce action. Here, the property settlement agreement 
was never made part of a divorce decree. 
Anthony, supra, at 211 P.2d 334. The court then observed: 
There is a marked distinction between the rule 
which governs in an action, other than divorce, on a 
contract executed under authority of sections 158 and 159 
of the Civil code and the rule which governs such ~ontracts 
when presented to a divorce court. In the former instance, 
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they are judged by the same rules as any other ordinary 
contract between individuals occupying fiduciary relations 
and, if found to be valid, are binding on the parties and' 
are recognized and enforced by courts; while in the latter 
instance, because of the unlimited power vested in the 
divorce court to make disposition of community property and 
to award support, such contracts, when pleaded and relied 
upon, are not binding or conclusive on the divorce court 
until subjected to examination of the court in the divorce 
action and approved. 
Anthony, supra, at 211 P.2d 334. 
The trial court reviewed and found reasonable the 
terms of the Stipulation of the parties before incorporating 
said terms in the Decree of Divorce. Subsequently, that court 
again reviewed the mortgage payment provision, determining the 
provision to be part of the property settlement between the 
parties and ordering continued payments. That determination, 
based on the court's review of all the facts and circumstances, 
including defendant's mistake argument, should be affirmed 
unless this Court finds that the determination works a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of 
discretion. English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah, 1977) 
Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977); Hanson v. Hanson, 
537 P.2d 491 (Utah, 1975). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to meet its burden of showing t~ 
trial court's Order erroneous. 
First, defendant has failed to prove any 
misapplication of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court 
in its interpretation of paragraph 2 or in its subsequent Ord~ 
to the defendant to continue payment of the monthly mortgage 
obligation. 
-18-
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Second, the defendant has failed to prove authority 
for his contention that this Court has jurisdiction to modify 
property settlements which are based upon agreement between the 
parties. Assuming this Court finds such property settlements 
modifidable, the defendant has not proven a substantial change 
of circumstance necessary for modification. In fact, plaintiff 
has demonstrated that an equitable resolution requires 
affirmation of the trial court's Order. 
Third, the defendant is incorrect in asserting that a 
decree, founded upon a stipulation containing a material 
mistake and misunderstanding, fails in the same manner as a 
contract. Plaintiff has convincingly demonstrated that this is 
not the law in Utah. The Decree of Divorce was the product of 
the trial court. It has subsequently been interpreted by the 
trial court. The Order of the trial court should not be 
modified except upon a finding of abuse of discretion or gross 
inequity. 
IT rs THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED that the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County committed no 
error, and that its Order against defendant Calvin D. West in 
favor of Shirley West Chandler be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
ByHal N. ~v.-·taon 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: ( 801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Shirley West Chandler 
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